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Abstract—The concept of electricity markets in the 
deregulated environment generally refers to energy market and 
reactive power market is not paid attention as much as it 
deserves to. However, reactive power plays an important role in 
distribution networks to improve network conditions such as 
voltage profile improvement and loss reduction. Plug in electric 
vehicles (PEVs) are mobile sources of active and reactive power, 
capable of being participated in energy market, and also in 
reactive power market without battery degradation. Active and 
reactive powers are coupled through the AC power flow 
equations and branch loading limits as well as PEVs and 
synchronous generators capability curves. This paper presents a 
coupled energy and reactive power market in the presence of 
PEVs. The objective function is three-fold namely, offers cost (for 
energy market), total payment function (TPF) (for reactive 
power market) and lost opportunity cost (LOC), all to be 
minimized. The effectiveness of the proposed coupled energy and 
reactive power market is studied based on a 134-node micro-grid 
with and without PEV participation. 
 
Index Terms—Coupled energy and reactive power market, 
Expected payment function (EPF), plug in electric vehicles 
(PEVs), Lost opportunity cost (LOC), and total payment function 
(TPF). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
eactive power has a major role in ensuring the reliability 
and security of power systems. It improves the voltage 
profile and increases the transferring power factor. There 
are many works in the area of reactive power compensation 
and production using SVCs and FACTS devices [1-2]. 
Reference [3] propose competitive reactive power market in 
single or multi–objective function optimization problem that 
the objectives are total payment function (TPF), overload 
index and voltage deviation index and voltage stability 
margin. The works in [4-6], incorporate PEVs in the reactive 
power market as a new reactive power source in the form of 
single objective and multi–objective functions. The objective 
function is to minimize TPF in [4], minimize TPF and grid 
losses in multi objective function in[5] and minimize the 
expected TPF in stochastic framework [6]. In[7], a coupled 
energy and active power market clearing considering power 
system security has been presented. In most of these papers, 
the synchronous generator has been used as the main source 
for reactive power.  
The PEV technology has been deployed in an attempt to 
decrease greenhouse gases as well as air pollution in urban 
areas. PEVs have been considered as the subject of many 
studies and are expected to take the future of transportation 
[8]. PEVs have high capability in providing reactive power 
[9], incorporation in the ancillary service market [10], 
participating in demand response programs [11], even 
harmonic compensation as active filter [12], and it is 
integrated into microgrids as a micro-source and micro-storage 
systems [13] as well.  
It is noted that the dollar paid for reactive power 
compensation is much lower than that for energy production. 
Therefore, clearing of the coupled energy and reactive power 
market is not in the interest of the bulk power system utilities. 
Besides that, in the coupled market, computing burden is 
greater respect to decoupled energy and reactive power 
markets. However in distribution systems and micro-grids, the 
required energy is likely to be provided by local sources and 
DGs, and thereby the concurrent optimization of active and 
reactive power supply could be the basis of many studies. 
Accordingly, in this paper, a coupled energy and reactive 
power market is proposed in the presence of PEVs in a micro-
grid. The main contribution of this paper is the development of 
a structural framework for the coupled energy and reactive 
power market in the context of microgirds incorporating PEVs 
where PEVs are allowed to participate actively in the reactive 
power market.  
The remainder of this paper is as follow. In section II, the 
decoupled energy market, the decoupled reactive power 
market and the coupled energy and reactive power market 
with the incorporation of PEVs are discussed consecutively. 
Section III presents the case study and simulation results. 
Finally in section IV, we have conclusions. 
II. THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
The formulation of coupled market in the presence of PEVs is 
presented in this section. At first, the decoupled energy and 
reactive power market are discussed in brief. Then the coupled 
energy and reactive power market is formulated. 
A. Decoupled energy market including PEVs  
Each PEV includes battery that can absorb/inject energy 
from/to grid as shown in Fig. 1. In fact, PEVs can participate 
in the energy market in the form of singular or integrated to 
inject/absorb energy from/to grid via V2G technology. In the 
energy market, the generators can only inject power to the grid 
while the PEVs can either inject or absorb energy from the 
grid. In other words, in comparison with generator for which 
power flow is unidirectional, the power transfer of PEVs is 
bidirectional. It is noted that the aggregators are third party 
entities that have the responsibility of participating in 
electricity markets on behalf of a large number of PEV owners 
with the aim of maximizing the profit through market 
mechanism while satisfying the owners’ requirements. 
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Fig. 1: Capability of PEV for injecting/absorbing active and reactive power 
into/from the grid via V2G technology  
 
Accordingly, the aggregators participate in the wholesale 
energy market. In that case, some aggregators participate in 
the power pool market as generators/loads to inject/absorb a 
large amount of electric power. So, the aggregators will be the 
same as other participants from the viewpoint of the 
independent system operator. But in this paper, a local market 
(retail market) has been considered such that the production 
and energy consumption is much lower than wholesale 
market. Also, this local market is considered as price-taker 
participant with respect to the upstream network market. In 
fact, the local market operator benefits the advantage of PEVs 
and uses them in order to reduce the costs of energy and 
reactive power. All in all, the proposed joint market 
framework can be adopted for the wholesale and retail 
markets. Accordingly, if it is considered for the wholesale 
market, then the aggregators can be modeled as a big PEV (as 
modeled in the following); in the case of retail market, also, it 
can be considered that small aggregators and individual PEVs 
can participate in the market. 
Using power electronic converter in the PEVs structure, 
they can produce active, reactive and distorted power (to 
compensate of power system harmonics). Therefore, they can 
participate in the energy market, reactive power market and 
even harmonic power market, if exists. Therefore, in order to 
increase the incentive for PEV owners to participate in the 
energy market, the independent system operator (ISO) should 
use a suitable auction mechanism such that not only cover all 
costs of PEV owners, but also the PEV owners can maximize 
their profits.  
The market can be cleared based on Pay-as-Bid or pay at 
market clearing price (MCP). In this paper the market is 
settled based on MCP mechanism to determine the 
corresponding payments for the selected generating units 
(PEV and generator) [7, 14-16]. The total payment in the 
energy market consists of two-part that are the payment of 
PEV owners and generator owners. Accordingly, the objective 
function of the energy market in the presence of PEVs is as 
follows: 
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where, 
i
e and 
j
e  are bid price for energy for the i
th generator 
unit and jth PEV unit, respectively; iGP  and 
j
PP are active power 
output of generators and PEVs in the energy market, 
respectively; NG and NP are number of generator and PEV 
units, respectively. 
 
B. Decoupled reactive power market in the presence of PEVs 
The PEV owners, should offer their price components based 
on the Expected Payment Function(EPF) [3]. This matter 
requires the capability curve of PEVs which is extracted 
from[4] and shown in Fig. 2. 
According to Fig. 2, the apparent power output of PEV is 
limited by four curves. A1 and A2are related to inverter 
maximum output power in kVA. CurvesB1 and B2 are related 
to the maximum active power of PEV that is injected to the 
grid or absorbed from the grid. 
Based on the capability curve of PEV shown in Fig. 2, the 
expected payment function (EPF) of PEV can be defined 
inspired by the EPF presented for synchronous generator in 
[3]. The EPF of PEV is shown in Fig. 3 and described in 
details in [4] which can be mathematically written as: 
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where a0j, m1j, m2j, , m3jand m4j are the bid values of the jth 
PEV for the reactive power market. As shown in Fig. 3, the 
cost of loss and the opportunity cost, both are a quadratic 
function of Q. Also the EPF of generator is: 
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Fig. 3: Reactive power offer structure of PEV. 
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where ia0 is the availability price offer in dollars, 
im1  is cost of 
loss price offer for operating in under excited mode (Qmin<Q ≤ 
0) in $/MVAr-h, 
im2 is cost of loss price offer for operating in 
region (Qbase ≤ Q ≤ QA) in $/MVAr-h and 
im
3
 is opportunity 
price offer for operating in region [3]. 
The reactive power is settled based on the minimization of 
total payment function (TPF) paid to the participants of 
reactive power market. In other words, the objective function 
of the cost minimization problem is the EPF of PEVs plus the 
EPF of synchronous generators. Therefore, the total payment 
will depend on the market price of the five components of the 
bid prices offered by the PEVs and four components of the bid 
prices offered by synchronous generators. The total payment 
function (TPF) is formulated as follows: 
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whereρ0, ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, and ρ4 are the market clearing prices 
(MCPs) of offer prices of market participants for a0, m1, m2, 
m3 and m4, respectively which are accepted in the reactive 
power market. The discussion for TPFi is the same as what 
found in[3, 17]. However, TPFj deserves more explanation. 
According to (4), the PEV owner is paid for losses payment as 
it enter region I, IV for reactive power absorption, and region 
II, III for reactive power production. Despite the synchronous 
generator (which is a linear function), the losses payment of 
PEV is quadratic function of PEV reactive power output. The 
LOC payment of PEV is similar to that of synchronous 
generator which is a quadratic function of its reactive power 
output[5, 7]. The objective function (4) is minimized subjected 
to the following equality and inequality constraints. 
- Load flow constraints: 
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where, k and l are bus indices. 
- The operation constraints of generators [18]: 
indexgeneratorthei};,{W,W,W,W i,i,i,i,  103210  (7) 
iiii QQQQ 321   (8) 
011  iimin,i, QQ.W  (9) 
i,Ai,ii,basei, Q.WQQ.W 222   (10) 
i,Bi,ii,Ai, Q.WQQ.W 333   (11) 
i,i,i,i, WWWW 0321   (12) 
It is noted that, QA is the point at which synchronous 
generators enter to LOC region to generate reactive power QB. 
- The operation constraints of PEV[5, 7]: 
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Where, Q1j, Q2j, Q3j, and Q4j based on Fig. 3, represent the 
regions (Qb' to QM'), (Qbto QM), (QM to QN), and (QM' to QN'), 
respectively. W1j, W2j, W3j and W4j are binary variables, 
showing the compensation region of the PEV. If the jthPEV is 
participated in the reactive power market and operated in 
region (Qb' to Qb), then W0j = 1 and W1j =W2j =W3j=W4j = 0. If 
the accepted unit is operated in region I (Qb' to QM') then W0j = 
W1j = 1 and W2j = W3j =W4j = 0. If the unit is operated in 
region II (Qb to QM) then W0j =W2j= 1 and W1j = W3j =W4j = 0. 
If the unit is operated in region III (QM to QN) then W0j =W3j= 
1 and W1j = W2j =W4j = 0, and if the unit is operated in region 
IV (QM' to QN') then W0j =W4j= 1 and W1j = W2j =W3j = 0. 
When the jth PEV is not selected or is selected and operated in 
one of the regions I, II, III, IV then the constraint (19) will be 
satisfied in the equality form (i.e. 0 = 0 or 1 = 1, respectively). 
However, when the jth PEV is selected for reactive power 
reserve of network, then constraint (19) will be satisfied in the 
inequality form (i.e. 0 < 1). 
- Constraints related to determination of MCPs of price 
components in reactive power market: 
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- PEV capability curve constraints: 
  222 n,jjloss,jj SQPP   (29) 
For discharging mode (curveA2) 
  222 n,jjloss,jj SQPP   (30) 
For charging mode (curveA1) 
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Maximum PEV output power (Curves B1 and B2): 
Sj,n is the nominal apparent output power of jth PEV and  Pj,a+ 
and Pj,a- are the maximum discharging and charging active 
power of PEV, respectively which are determined by PEV 
owners. 
- Generators capability curve constraints: 
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Capability curve limit (armature current limit): 
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Capability curve limit (Field current limit): 
Vt is generator terminal voltage, Eaf is the excitation voltage, Ia 
is the armature current and Xs is the synchronous reactance of 
synchronous generator. More details of synchronous generator 
capability curve can be found in [7, 17-19]. 
C. Coupled energy and reactive power markets 
In the electricity market, any decreasing of active power 
due to increasing of reactive power must be remunerated. In 
other words, the LOC payment must be considered in the 
payment function. From (4), it can be seen that the LOC 
payment is a quadratic function of produced reactive power 
for both PEV and synchronous generator. In couple and 
decouple market, PEV and generator will be paid for the LOC 
for reduction of active power generation but in a different 
formulation. In the coupled market, the LOC is formulated in 
a different way compared with that of the decoupled reactive 
power market. So, in this subsection at first, the formulation of 
LOC consideration in the coupled market is explained and 
then the proposed coupled framework is introduced and 
discussed. 
1) LOC consideration in decoupled and coupled markets 
The LOC of a PEV and generator in the coupled market, are 
calculated based on the MCP of the energy-only market as 
well as their bid prices in the market and it includes two parts 
as follows: 
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where, iGLOC  and
j
PLOC  are related to generator and PEV, 
respectively. 0
i
GP and 0
j
PP represent the active power output of 
the ith generator unit and jth PEV unit in the energy-only 
market respectively, and iGP and
j
PP represent the active power 
output of the ith generator unit and jth PEV unit in coupled 
market, respectively. The variables iGLOP and 
j
PLOP are defined 
as follow [7]: 
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where, 
i
gene,  and ,
j
e pev  indicate the bid price of the i
th 
generator unit and jth PEV unit in the energy market, 
respectively and 
MCPe,  represents the market clearing price of 
the energy-only market. From (35) and (36) it can be seen that 
only the PEV and generator units accepted in the energy-only 
market might be paid for their LOC. 
2) TPF consideration in decoupled and coupled markets 
In the proposed coupled market, the quadratic term of the 
TPF related to the LOC payment is substituted by the new 
formulation described in (34) to (36). Therefore, the TPF for 
reactive power compensation in the coupled market only 
includes availability and loss payments as follows [7]: 
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The TPF includes two terms: first term is related to 
generators payment and the second one is to PEVs. The two 
regions (Qbase–QA) and (QA–QB) are merged in first part of (37) 
compared with (4), since both regions have the same operation 
payment so, 
C
jW2  refers to the two merged regions in the 
coupled market. Similar to that for generator, in PEV, the 
regions (Qb–QM) and (QM–QN) and the regions (Qb’–QM’) and 
(QM’–QN’) are merged in the second part of (4) as written in 
(37). 1
C
jW and 2
C
jW are binary variable indicating the operation 
in regions (Qb–QN) and (Qb’–QN’), respectively. 
3) Objective function in the coupled markets 
The objective function of the coupled energy and reactive 
power market is composed of the offer cost of generating units 
and PEVs for their active power production, the TPF of units 
for their reactive power compensation and the LOC payment 
of the units as: 
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(38) 
where, NG and NP are the number of synchronous generators 
and PEVs, respectively. In (38), the first and second term refer 
to offer cost of generating units and PEVs in energy market. 
Also, the third and fourth terms are the LOC of generating 
units and PEVs as well.  TPF of generating units and PEVs for 
participating in reactive market have been addressed in fifth 
and sixth terms. As it can be seen, the objective function is in 
the form of MINLP due to presence of binary variables W1j, 
W2j, W3j and W4j as well as quadratic formulation in the last 
term of (38).The objective function (38) is minimized 
subjected to the following equality and inequality constraints: 
 
 - Load flow constraints: 
Constraints (5) and (6) are used to validate for this objective 
function. 
 
- The operation constraints of generators: 
indexgeneratorthei};,{W,W,W C,ii,i,  10210  (39) 
C
ii i
QQQ
21
  (40) 
011  iimin,i, QQ.W  (41) 
i,B
C,iC
ii,base
C,i Q.WQQ.W 222   (42) 
i,
C,i
i, WWW 021   (43) 
 
- The operation constraints of PEV: 
indexPHEVsj;},{W,W,W C,jC,jj  10210  (44) 
jjj QQQ 21   (45) 
j'N
C,j
jj'b
C,j Q.WQQ.W 111   (46) 
Nj
C,j
jb
C,j Q.WQQ.W 222   (47) 
j,
C,jC,j WWW 021   (48) 
where, Q1j and Q2j represent the regions (Qb' to QN') and (Qb to 
QN) respectively. 
C,jW1 and
C,j
W2  are binary variable, showing 
the compensation region of the PEV.  
 
- Constraints related to determination of MCPs of price 
components in reactive power market: 
000 i,i, aW  (49) 
111 i,i, mW  (50) 
222 i,
C,i mW  (51) 
000 j,j, aW  (52) 
111 j,
C,j
mW  (53) 
222 j,
C,j mW  (54) 
- PEV capability curve constraints 
Constraints (29) to (31) are validate for this objective function. 
- Generators capability curve constraints 
Constraints (32) and (33) are valid for this objective function. 
The MINLP optimization problem of (38) to (54) is modeled 
in GAMS software using DICOPT solver [20]. The DICOPT 
solver is based on the extensions of the outer approximation 
algorithm for the equality relaxation strategy. It iteratively 
invokes the MINOS5 and XA10.0 solvers for nonlinear (NLP) 
and mixed-integer-programming (MIP) solutions, respectively 
[20]. The GAMS/DICOPT algorithm has built-in provisions to 
handle non-convexities, and hence, we can, with a fair degree 
of confidence, rely on the GAMS/DICOPT optimal solutions 
to be globally optimal [20]. It should be mentioned however 
that, there are some works ongoing in the area of global 
optimization methods [21-22], and improved techniques (or 
solvers with higher confidence levels) should appear in the 
literature in the coming years [22]. 
III. CASE STUDY 
To transfer power between grid and PEV, there must be a 
suitable communication infrastructure and metering devices in 
the power system, which can be found in a smart grid. For the 
analytical studies, a realistic low voltage residential 
distribution network is used. This network is related to a 
suburban area of Dublin, Ireland. Fig. 4 shows the one-line 
diagram of this feeder. This feeder, supplies 134 single-phase 
households and 17 PEVs which household loads are served at 
a lag power factor of 0.9 and PEV batteries are modeled as 
constant loads with unity power factor. The non-unity power 
factor of loads is assumed in order to reactive power studies 
purposes. The total number of PEVs connected to network is 
17. More details about this network are available in [23]. 
Also, in this study, the maximum transferable reactive 
power between grid and PEV is considered about 5kVar 
(level-3 charging, the maximum output power is equal up to 
16.8 kW (240V, 70A) [9, 24-25]).To study our proposed 
coupled market framework, besides clearing of the coupled 
active and reactive power market, the energy and reactive 
power market are cleared in the form of decoupled. In other 
words, three markets are cleared and all of them are cleared 
for peak loading conditions of network and with and without 
participation of PEVs. Furthermore, it is supposed that only 
synchronous generator and PEVs are considered as the 
participant of the markets. 
Also, in this paper, the consumers are considered as price 
taker loads and inelastic to avoid the unnecessary intricacies. 
So, the consumers load is considered as non-deferrable and 
non-interruptible demands that always have been served. 
It is noted that, in the energy market, generator and PEVs 
submits their offer prices and the outputs of synchronous 
generator and PEVs in the energy market are the boundary of 
participant wherein they entered to LOC region and should be 
paid for the LOC payment by the ISO if they are accepted in 
the reactive power market and operated in the LOC region. In  
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Fig. 4. The modified version of 134-node LV network 
other words, the (PA, QA) of synchronous generator [3, 7] and 
(PM, QM) of PEVs [4-6] are determined based on their output 
in the energy market cleared previously. 
In our study, generator as a reactive power provider submits 
its four-component price offers, i.e.a0, m1, m2, and m3 while, 
the owners of PEVs, similar to the works in[4-6], offer their 
five-component price as a0, m1, m2, m3, and m4 in order to 
participate in the reactive power market. The price offers of 
energy and reactive power market participants are given in 
Table 1. The optimization problem of reactive power market 
clearing is in the form of mixed integer non-linear 
programming (MINLP) that is modeled in GAMS software 
using DICOPT solver [20]. 
The results of energy market clearing with PEVs (Case 1) and 
without incorporation of PEVs (Case 2) are listed in Table 2. 
In the case of participation of PEVs, the total payment to 
participants (PEV + Generator) is 24.39 $ that includes 3.15 $ 
for PEVs and 21.24 $ for generator.  
The outputs of PEV #6, #11, #14 and #17 in the energy 
market are zero. In other words, their offers are not accepted 
in the market due to their high offer prices. The offer price of 
generator is lower than that of the PEV; therefore, the 
generator increases its output power to meet the system 
demand. In the competitive market, each player offers the 
lower price for its production, has the greater chance of being 
selected in the market. The results of decoupled reactive 
power market clearing are shown in Table 3. The system 
reactive power demand is 216.78kVAr of which 56.51kVar is 
supplied by PEVs and 160.27kVar by generator. In this case, 
some of the PEVs enter to the LOC region and ISO preferred 
to purchase the reactive power from PEV, which is cheaper 
than generator due to their offer prices. Because of low offer 
price of PEV #2, #4, #5, #8, #12 and #16along with generator 
for minimizing total payment, enter to LOC region and ISO 
provides the required reactive power from them. 
 
Table 1: Active and reactive power offer prices of participant PEVs and 
Synchronous Generator (SG) 
Node 
No. 
PEV 
No. 
Offer price 
for active 
power  
($/kWh) 
Components of offer prices for reactive 
power 
4m 1m a0 m2 m3 
3 1 4.12 0.7 0.73 0.09 0.73 0.7 
14 2 5.28 0.79 0.6 0.1 0.6 0.79 
17 3 5.59 0.83 0.57 0.09 0.57 0.83 
23 4 4.96 0.6 0.48 0.1 0.48 0.6 
33 5 3.68 0.83 0.52 0.07 0.52 0.83 
36 6 6.96 0.61 0.54 0.09 0.54 0.61 
52 7 4.23 0.7 0.36 0.1 0.36 0.7 
64 8 3.82 0.7 0.46 0.08 0.46 0.7 
77 9 5.41 0.82 0.49 0.1 0.49 0.82 
68 10 4.37 0.79 0.56 0.08 0.56 0.79 
89 11 6.49 0.77 0.46 0.07 0.46 0.77 
92 12 4.63 0.72 0.38 0.1 0.38 0.72 
104 13 5.71 0.67 0.54 0.08 0.54 0.67 
106 14 6.19 0.69 0.57 0.08 0.57 0.69 
116 15 4.22 0.68 0.56 0.11 0.56 0.68 
130 16 5.3 0.77 0.48 0.08 0.48 0.77 
131 17 6.86 0.6 0.47 0.1 0.47 0.6 
Grid Gen. - 5.75 0.7 0.82 0.1 0.82 0.7 
 
The total payment in the reactive power market is 5.96 $ of 
which 491.42 cents of dollar is paid for generator and 
104.54cents of dollar for PEVs. The details of this payment 
are listed in four last column of Table 3. The LOC cost only 
paid to participants that enter to LOC region. To evaluate the 
presence of PEVs in the reactive power market, none of them 
incorporated in the market and the required reactive power is 
provided by the generator. Therefore, due to increasing the 
output reactive power of generator, it enters to LOC region 
and causes to increase the total payment of generator. The 
total payment of generator is 15.03 $ which is composed of  
Table 2: Optimal solution of energy-only market for peak loading condition 
(decoupled market) 
Node No. PEV No. Pgenerated (kWh) Energy Cost ($) 
3 1 3.38 19.43 
14 2 4.82 27.72 
17 3 4.57 26.28 
23 4 4.53 26.05 
33 5 4.91 28.23 
36 6 0 0 
52 7 3.54 20.36 
64 8 4.97 28.58 
77 9 4.05 23.29 
68 10 4.07 23.4 
89 11 0 0 
92 12 4.64 26.68 
104 13 4 23 
106 14 0 0 
116 15 3.04 17.48 
130 16 4.17 23.98 
131 17 0 0 
Grid Gen. - 396.5 2124.63 
Total 451.19 2439 
 
three components: availability payment that is low, losses 
payment that is 234.2 cents of dollar and LOC payment that is 
much greater than the other payments. Accordingly, the 
participation of PEV in the reactive power market causes the 
generator not to enter in the LOC region and thereby the 
payment in the reactive power market decreases remarkably. 
Finally, the coupled active and reactive market is cleared in 
the presence of PEVs and the results are reported in Table. 4. 
In the coupled market, each participant is supposed to generate 
its active and reactive power in the region determined by its 
capability curve. In the coupled energy and reactive power 
market, a PEV could generate active power or reactive power 
simultaneously, for which the percentage of each power 
production is determined from its offer price for output active 
and reactive power and market clearing price. Therefore, each 
PEV would share its capacity to active and reactive power 
generation. The total payment for PEVs and generator is 
2726.64 cents of dollars and composed of three components: 
2492.77 cents of dollar for offer cost due to active power 
generation, 198.48 cents of dollar (TPF) for reactive power 
generation, and 35.39 cents of dollar for loss of opportunity 
(LOC). Incorporation of PEVs causes the generators not to 
enter to the LOC region. 
In the case of not participating PEVs in the coupled energy 
and reactive power market, the ISO must pay more payment 
for generator owing to increasing of its output power and 
entering to LOC region. In this case, the total payment will 
increase from 2726.64 cents of dollar to 2966.04 cents of 
dollar, of which2690.94 cents of dollar for cost of active 
power generation, 238.69 cents of dollar for reactive power 
production (TPF) and 36.41 cents of dollar for LOC payment. 
All of these three terms are increased as compared to the case 
of PEV participation in the market. 
Table 3: Optimal solution of reactive market for peak loading condition 
(decoupled reactive power market) 
Case 
No. 
Node 
No. 
PE
V 
No. 
Qgenerated 
(kVAr) 
Cost of (Cents in $) 
Availabilit
y 
Loss LOC TPF 
Case 1: 
With  
PEVs 
3 1 4.45 0.16 2.16 0 2.32 
14 2 4.7 0.16 2.29 1.68 4.13 
17 3 2.1 0.16 0 0 0.16 
23 4 4.36 0.16 6.36 4.64 11.17 
33 5 0.36 0.16 8.73 9.6 18.49 
36 6 3.95 0.16 1.18 0 1.33 
52 7 3.43 0.16 2.98 0 3.14 
64 8 4.11 0.16 3.33 3.79 7.28 
77 9 2.99 0.16 1.73 0 1.89 
68 10 1.93 0.16 2.36 0 2.52 
89 11 2.26 0.16 0 0 0.16 
92 12 4.45 0.16 10.73 10.27 21.16 
104 13 2.91 0.16 0.66 0 0.82 
106 14 4.54 0.16 5.08 0 5.24 
116 15 3.44 0.16 0 0 0.16 
130 16 3.7 0.16 13.35 10.69 24.2 
131 17 2.83 0.16 0.21 0 0.37 
Grid 
Gen. 
- 
160.27 0.16 
119.0
1 372.25 491.42 
∑ 
216.7
8 2.88 
180.1
6 412.92 595.96 
Case 2: 
Without 
PEVs 
Grid Gen. 
218.41 0.16 234.2 
1269.0
4 
1503.3
9 
∑ 
218.4
1 0.16 234.2 
1269.0
4 
1503.3
9 
 
The results presented in Table 4 also show the payment in 
decoupled active and reactive power markets. The payment in 
the coupled market is 279.54 cents of dollar (3006.18-
2726.64) lower than those of decoupled energy and reactive 
power market. In other words, the proposed coupled market 
framework in the presence of PEVs can reach to a better 
optimum solution than the commonly used decoupled active 
and reactive power markets. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a new framework is proposed for coupled 
energy and reactive power market in the presence of PEVs. 
The objective includes cost of energy, TPF of each unit (PEVs 
and generators) for their reactive power production and LOC 
of units due to the decrease in their active power generation to 
provide more reactive power. The new formulation of LOC in 
the coupled market is based on the MCP of the energy-only 
market. Using this framework, the ISO can simultaneously 
clear energy and reactive power market. Using the proposed 
method will result in decreasing the ISO payments to the 
participants. In other words, the value of objective function in 
the coupled market is lower than that of decoupled market. In 
addition, the results show that in both coupled and decoupled 
market, the ISO payment is greater in the case of the payment 
without PEVs in the market. This indicates the importance of 
the presence of PEVs in the market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Optimal solution of decoupled and coupled active and reactive market   
Case 
Node 
No. 
PEV 
No. 
Coupled Market Decoupled Market 
Pgenerated(kW) 
Qgenerated 
(kVAr) 
Energy 
Cost ($) 
TPF 
($) 
LOC 
($) 
Pgenerated(kVA
r) 
Qgenerated 
(kVAr) 
Energy 
Cost 
($) 
TPF 
($) 
LOC 
($) 
With 
Participation 
of PEVs 
3 1 2.46 0.78 14.15 0.25 1.5 3.38 4.45 19.44 2.32 0 
14 2 1.4 0.5 8.05 0.11 1.62 1.71 4.7 9.83 4.13 1.68 
17 3 2.19 3.39 12.59 4.72 0.38 4.57 2.1 26.28 0.16 0 
23 4 4.56 2.05 26.22 1.73 0 2.45 4.36 14.09 11.17 4.64 
33 5 2.02 1.88 11.62 1.45 5.99 4.99 0.36 28.69 18.49 9.6 
36 6 1.04 4.89 6 9.81 0 0 3.95 0 1.33 0 
52 7 1.01 1.19 5.81 0.58 3.85 3.54 3.43 20.36 3.14 0 
64 8 0.3 4.31 1.72 7.62 9.04 2.85 4.11 16.39 7.28 3.79 
77 9 0.67 4.14 3.85 7.03 1.17 4.05 2.99 23.29 1.89 0 
68 10 0.08 2.33 0.46 2.23 5.52 4.07 1.93 23.4 2.52 0 
89 11 1.52 1.22 8.74 0.61 0 0 2.26 0 0.16 0 
92 12 0.6 2.04 3.45 1.71 4.53 2.28 4.45 13.11 21.16 10.27 
104 13 3.31 3.75 19.02 5.77 0.03 4 2.91 23 0.82 0 
106 14 0.38 0.22 2.19 0.11 0 0 4.54 0 5.24 0 
116 15 2.35 1.84 13.51 1.39 1.06 3.04 3.44 17.48 0.16 0 
130 16 2.63 2.72 15.12 3.04 0.7 3.36 3.7 19.32 24.2 10.69 
131 17 0.61 3.35 3.51 4.6 0 0 2.83 0 0.37 0 
Grid Gen. - 406.39 187.58 2336.76 145.72 0 406.71 160.27 2338.58 491.42 326.81 
∑ 433.52 228.18 2492.77 198.48 35.39 451.19 216.78 2593.26 595.96 412.92 
∑( Energy Cost +LOC 
Cost + TPF Cost) 
2492.77+ 35.39+198.48=2726.64 cent of dollar 
∑( Energy Cost + TPF 
Cost) 
2593.26+412.92=3006.18 
 cent of dollar 
Without 
Participation 
of PEVs 
Grid Gen. - 467.99 218.41 2690.94 238.69 36.41 451.19 217.03 2439 1503.39 1269.04 
∑( Energy Cost +LOC 
Cost + TPF Cost) 
2690.94+ 36.41+238.69=2966.04 cents of dollar 
∑( Energy Cost + TPF 
Cost) 
2439+1269.04=3708.04  
cents of dollar 
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